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Abstract—Mobile communication systems are now an essential
part of life throughout the world. Fourth generation “Long
Term Evolution” (LTE) mobile communication networks are
being deployed. The LTE suite of specifications is considered
to be significantly better than its predecessors not only in terms
of functionality but also with respect to security and privacy
for subscribers. We carefully analyzed LTE access network
protocol specifications and uncovered several vulnerabilities.
Using commercial LTE mobile devices in real LTE networks,
we demonstrate inexpensive, and practical attacks exploiting
these vulnerabilities. Our first class of attacks consists of three
different ways of making an LTE device leak its location: In
our experiments, a semi-passive attacker can locate an LTE
device within a 2 km2 area in a city whereas an active attacker
can precisely locate an LTE device using GPS co-ordinates
or trilateration via cell-tower signal strength information. Our
second class of attacks can persistently deny some or all services
to a target LTE device. To the best of our knowledge, our work
constitutes the first publicly reported practical attacks against LTE
access network protocols.
We present several countermeasures to resist our specific
attacks. We also discuss possible trade-off considerations that may
explain why these vulnerabilities exist. We argue that justification
for these trade-offs may no longer valid. We recommend that
safety margins introduced into future specifications to address
such trade-offs should incorporate greater agility to accommodate
subsequent changes in the trade-off equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, mobile devices such as
smartphones have become ubiquitous. The reach of mobile
communication systems, starting from the second generation
Global System for Mobile Communications (2G/GSM) and the
third generation Universal Mobile Telecommunication Systems
(3G/UMTS), has extended to every corner in the world. Mobile
communication is an important cornerstone in the lives of the
vast majority of people and societies on this planet. The latest
generation in this evolution, the fourth generation “Long Term
Evolution” (4G/LTE) systems are being deployed widely. By
the end of 2015 the worldwide LTE subscriber base is expected
to be around 1.37 billion [1].
Early 2G systems were known to have several vulnera-
bilities. For example, lack of mutual authentication between
mobile users and the network implied that it was possible for
an attacker to set up fake base stations and convince legitimate
mobile devices to connect to it. In order to minimize exposure
of user identifiers (known as International Mobile Subscriber
Identifier or IMSI) in over-the-air signaling messages, 2G
systems introduced the use of temporary mobile subscriber
identifiers. However, in the absence of mutual authentication,
fake base stations were used as “IMSI catchers” to harvest
IMSIs and to track movements of users.
The evolution of these mobile communication systems
specified by 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project)
have not only incorporated improvements in functionality but
also strengthened security. 3G specifications introduced mutual
authentication and the use of stronger and well-analyzed cryp-
tographic algorithms. LTE specifications further strengthened
signaling protocols by requiring authentication and encryption
(referred to as “ciphering” in 3GPP terminology) in more
situations than was previously required. Consequently, there is
a general belief that LTE specifications provide strong privacy
and availability guarantees to mobile users. Previously known
attacks, such as the ability to track user movement were
thought to be difficult in LTE.
In this paper, we demonstrate the first practical attacks
against LTE access network protocols. Our attacks are based
on vulnerabilities we discovered during a careful analysis of
LTE access network protocol specifications. They fall into two
classes: location leaks and denial of service. In the first class,
we describe three different attacks that can force an LTE
device (User Equipment or UE in 3GPP terminology) into
revealing its location. The first two allow a passive or semi-
passive attacker to localize the target user within about a 2
km2 area in an urban setting which is a much finer granularity
than previously reported location leak attacks [2] against 2G
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devices, while still using similar techniques. Notably, we show
how popular social network messaging applications (e.g., Face-
book messenger [3] and WhatsApp [4]) can be used in such
attacks. Our third attack allows an active attacker exploiting
vulnerabilities in the specification and implementation of LTE
Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol [5] to accurately
pinpoint the target user via GPS co-ordinates or trilateration
using base station signal strengths as observed by that UE. We
believe that all LTE devices in the market are vulnerable to
this attack.
In the second class, we describe three further attacks where
an active attacker can cause persistent denial of service against
a target UE. In the first, the target UE will be forced into using
2G or 3G networks rather than LTE networks, which can then
make it possible to mount 2G/3G-specific attacks against that
UE. In the second, the target UE will be denied access to all
networks. In the last attack, the attacker can selectively limit a
UE only to some types of services (e.g., no voice calls). The
attacks are persistent and silent: devices require explicit user
action (such as rebooting the device) to recover.
We have implemented all our attacks (except one) and
confirmed their effectiveness using commercial LTE devices
from several vendors and real LTE networks of several carriers.
The equipment needed for the attacks is inexpensive and
readily available. We reported our attacks to the manufacturers
and carriers concerned as well as to the standardization body
(3GPP). Remedial actions are under way while writing.
Specification of a large system like LTE is a complex
endeavor involving many trade-offs among conflicting require-
ments. Rather than merely report on LTE vulnerabilities and
attacks, we also discuss possible considerations that may have
led to the vulnerabilities in the first place. Based on this we
suggest some general guidelines for future standardization as
well as specific fixes for our attacks.
• Fine-grained location leaks: New passive and active
techniques to link users’ real identities to LTE tem-
porary identities assigned to them and to track user
locations and movements to much higher levels
of granularity than was previously thought possible.
(Section V)
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks: New active DoS
attacks that can silently and persistently down-
grade LTE devices by preventing their access to
LTE networks (limiting them to less secure 2G/3G
networks or denying network access altogether) or
limiting them to a subset of LTE services. (Section VI)
• Implementation & Evaluation: Inexpensive software
and hardware framework to implement the attacks
based on srsLTE, OpenLTE, and Universal Software
Radio Peripherals (USRP) (Section IV), and evalua-
tion of the attacks using commercially available LTE
phones in real networks. (Sections V–VII)
• Security Analysis: Discussion outlining possible un-
derlying reasons for the vulnerabilities, including
perceived or actual trade-offs between security/privacy
and other criteria like availability, performance and
functionality, as well as recommending fixes. (Sec-
tion VIII).
II. OVERVIEW OF LTE ARCHITECTURE
We briefly describe LTE infrastructure as well as security
and paging mechanisms to assist readers in understanding the
vulnerabilities and attacks we present in this paper.
A. LTE infrastructure
We consider a simplified LTE architecture involving com-
ponents required to set up access network protocols between
a base station and mobile devices. We hide other details of
the architecture which are not relevant from the point of view
of understanding our attacks. Figure 1 depicts this simplified
architecture which contains three main components: User
Equipment (UE), Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access
Network (E-UTRAN), and Evolved Packet Core (EPC). All
three components are collectively referred to as Evolved Packet
System (EPS) according to 3GPP terminology. In the interest
of simplicity, throughout this paper we refer to the whole
system as LTE. The three components are described below
(A list of common acronyms related to LTE appear in the full
version of this paper [6]).
Fig. 1. LTE system architecture
User Equipment: UE refers to the actual communication
device which can be, for example, a smartphone . A UE
contains a USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module)[7],
which represents the IMSI and stores the corresponding au-
thentication credentials [8]. This IMSI is used to identify an
LTE user (generally referred to as “subscriber” in 3GPP ter-
minology) uniquely. The USIM participates in LTE subscriber
authentication protocol and generates cryptographic keys that
form the basis for the key hierarchy subsequently used to
protect signaling and user data communication between the
UE and base stations over the radio interface.
E-UTRAN: E-UTRAN consists of base stations. It manages
the radio communication with the UE and facilitates commu-
nication between the UE and EPC. In LTE, a base station
is technically referred as “evolved NodeB (eNodeB)”. The
eNodeB uses a set of access network protocols, called Access
Stratum (AS) for exchanging signaling messages with its UEs.
These AS messages include Radio Resource control (RRC)
protocol messages. Other functions of eNodeB include paging
UEs, over-the-air security, physical layer data connectivity, and
handovers. Each eNodeB is connected to the EPC through an
interface named S1.
MME in EPC: EPC provides core network functionalities by
a new all-IP mobile core network designed for LTE systems. It
consists of several new elements as defined in [9]. However, for
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our work we need to describe only the Mobility Management
Entity (MME) in detail. MME is responsible for authenticating
and allocating resources (data connectivity) to UEs when
they connect to the network. Other important functions of
MME involve security (setting up integrity and encryption for
signaling) [10] and tracking UE’s location at a macro level.
The set of protocols run between UE and MME are referred
as Non-Access Stratum (NAS).
Now, we explain how the system components presented
above can be deployed in a geographical region (e.g., in a
city) by mobile network carriers (more commonly referred to
as “operators” in 3GPP terminology) to provide LTE services.
A service area of a mobile operator is geographically divided
into several regions known as Tracking Areas (TAs). TAs are
similar to Location Areas in GSM networks and are managed
by the MME. Further, a TA contains a group of “cells”1
each of which is controlled by an eNodeB. The eNodeB
broadcasts operator-specific information such as Tracking Area
Code (TAC), Mobile Country Code (MCC), Mobile Network
Code (MNC), and cell ID via System Information Block
(SIB) messages [5]. This allows UEs to identify their serving
network operator, and initiate a connection to the network.
A UE attaches to the network by initiating the Attach
procedure [11]. Upon successful acceptance the UE receives
access to services based on its subscription. The UE uses
the TrackingAreaUpdate(TAU) procedure to inform the
network about its mobility in the serving area [11].
B. Security in LTE
As IMSI is a permanent identifier of a subscriber, LTE
specifications try to minimize its transmission in over-the-
air radio communication for security and privacy reasons.
Instead, a Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI) [8]
is used to identify subscribers during radio communication. It
is assigned to UEs during Attach and may be periodically
changed to provide temporal unlinkability of traffic to/from
the same UE. An Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
protocol is used for mutual authentication between UE and the
network and to agree on session keys that provide integrity
and confidentiality protection for subsequent NAS and AS
messages [10]. Both NAS and AS security are collectively
referred as EPS security. It is established between a UE and a
serving network domain (eNodeB and MME) during EMM
(EPS Mobility Management) procedures [11] and includes
agreeing on session keys, preferred cryptographic algorithms,
and other values as defined in [10].
C. Paging in LTE
Paging refers to the process used when MME needs to
locate a UE in a particular area and deliver a network service,
such as incoming calls. Since MME may not know the exact
eNodeB to which UE is connected, it generates a paging
message and forwards to all eNodeBs in a TA. Simultaneously,
MME starts a paging timer (T3413) and expects a response
from UE before this timer expires. Thus, all eNodeBs present
in the paged TA broadcast a RRC paging message to locate
1In LTE, coverage area of an eNodeB is divided into several sectors known
as cells.
Fig. 2. Paging in LTE
the UE. Paging messages contain identities of UEs such as S-
TMSI(s) or IMSI(s). S-TMSI is a temporary identifier (SAE-
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity). It is part of a GUTI.
For the sake of simplicity, we consistently use the term GUTI
throughout the rest of this paper even when referring to S-
TMSI. Figure 2 highlights LTE paging procedure, described
in detail in the relevant LTE specifications [11], [12], [13].
The UE in IDLE state2 decodes RRC paging messages. If
it detects its IMSI then it initiates a new Attach procedure to
receive a GUTI as defined in [11]. If UE detects its GUTI,
it acquires a radio channel through the “Random Access
Procedure” [13] for requesting a RRC connection from the
eNodeB. “RRC Connection Setup” involves the configuration
of radio resources for exchanging signaling messages. Upon
receiving this setup message, the UE completes a three way
RRC handshake procedure by sending a “RRC Connection
Setup Complete” message along with a “Service Request”
message. At this point UE leaves IDLE state and enters
into CONNECTED state3. The eNodeB forwards the service
request message to MME, which in turn stops the paging timer.
Further, eNodeB establishes a security context and proceeds to
deliver network services to UE.
In LTE, the paging procedure is improved to reduce
signaling load and locate the UE faster using a technique
called Smart Paging [14], [15], [16]. It is compliant with
LTE specifications and consists of directing paging messages
selectively via the eNodeB (cell) where the UE was last seen.
If no response is received, paging is repeated in the entire
TA. In our experiments (Section V-B) to study LTE paging
procedures in a major city, we observed that several network
operators and vendors have implemented smart paging.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we describe the adversary model for our
attacks. The primary goals of the adversary against LTE
subscribers are: a) learn the precise location of a subscriber
in a given geographical area b) deny network services (both
2In IDLE state, the UE has no active connections with any eNodeB.
3CONNECTED means the UE has an active connection with an eNodeB.
3
mobile-terminated and mobile-originated) to a subscriber, and
c) force subscribers to use less secure GSM or 3G networks
thereby exposing them to various attacks such as IMSI catch-
ers [17]. We assume that the adversary is in the same geo-
graphical area as the victim. The adversary model is divided
into three attack modes as described below.
Passive
A passive adversary is able to silently sniff LTE over-the-air
(radio) broadcast channels. To achieve this, he/she has access
to a hardware device (for example Universal Software Radio
Peripheral (USRP)) and associated software needed to observe
and decode radio broadcast signaling messages.
Semi-Passive
A semi-passive adversary is, in addition to passive moni-
toring, able to trigger signaling messages to subscribers using
interfaces and actions that are legitimately available in LTE or
in higher layer systems. For example, a semi-passive adversary
can trigger paging messages to subscribers by sending a
message via a social network or initiating a call. The adversary
is assumed to be aware of social identities of subscribers.
For example, these identities can be a Facebook profile or
a mobile phone number of the subscriber. A semi-passive
adversary is analogous to the ‘honest-but-curious’ or ‘semi-
honest’ adversary model used for cryptographic protocols [18].
Active
The active adversary can set up and operate a rogue
eNodeB to establish malicious communication with UEs.
Capabilities required for active attacks include knowledge of
LTE specifications and hardware (USRP) that can be used
for impersonating subscriber’s serving operator network, and
injecting malicious packets to UEs. An active adversary is
analogous to the ‘malicious’ adversary model in cryptographic
protocols [18].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Software and hardware used in major telecommunication
systems have traditionally been proprietary (closed source) and
expensive. However recently open source telephony software
and low-cost hardware modules have started to emerge. In this
section, we explain our experimental setup built using low
cost off-the-shelf components and requiring only elementary
programming skills with knowledge of LTE specifications.
Figure 3 depicts the experimental setup.
Hardware
Hardware components for eNodeB, MME, and UE are
needed to build our experimental LTE network. On the network
side, we used a USRP B210 device [19] connected to a host
laptop (Intel i7 processor & Ubuntu 14.04 OS), acting as an
eNodeB. USRP is a software-defined radio peripheral that can
be connected to a host computer, to be used by host-based
software to transmit/receive data over the air. Even though we
utilized USRP B210 which costs around one thousand euros,
passive attacks can also be realized practically with more
cheaply available radio hardware. For example, RTL-SDR [20]
Fig. 3. Experimental setup
dongles which cost around 15 euros can be leveraged to
passively listen over the LTE air-interface. On the UE side, we
selected popular LTE-capable mobile phones available in the
market. These devices incorporate LTE implementations from
four major LTE baseband vendors who collectively account
for the vast majority of deployed LTE-capable UEs.
A. Passive and semi-passive attack setup
The research test-bed used in performing paging attacks
described in [2] was restricted to GSM networks due to the
unavailability of any LTE baseband implementations at that
time. Today, there are some partial LTE baseband implemen-
tations available as open source including OpenLTE [21]
and srsLTE [22], which enabled us to conduct real-time
experiments on LTE networks.
Implementation
In order to sniff LTE broadcast channels, we utilized parts
of srsLTE. It is a free library for software-defined radio
mobile terminals and base stations. Currently, the project is
developing a UE-side LTE baseband implementation. srsLTE
uses Universal Hardware Device library to communicate with
the USRP B210. Since all the passive sniffing is done in real-
time, it is recommended to have a high-speed host (laptop) in
order to handle the high (30.72 MHz) sampling rates without
data loss and also to maintain constant sync with eNodeBs.
In particular, we used the pdsch-ue application to scan
a specified frequency and detect surrounding eNodeBs. It
can listen and decode SIB messages broadcast by eNodeB.
Further, we modified pdsch-ue to decode paging messages
which are identified over-the-air with a Paging-Radio Network
Temporary Identifier (P-RNTI). Upon its detection, GUTI(s)
and/or IMSI(s) can be extracted out of paging messages.
In semi-passive attack mode, we use Facebook [23], [3]
and WhatsApp [4] applications over the Internet, in addition to
initiating communication with targets via silent text messages
or phone calls.
B. Active attack setup
We built an eNodeB to mount successful active attacks
against UEs registered with a real LTE network. In particular,
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our eNodeB impersonates a real network operator and forces
UEs to attach to it. The process of building such rogue
eNodeBs is described below.
Building rogue eNodeB: Generally, UE always scans for
eNodeBs around it and prefers to attach to the eNodeB
with the best signal power. Hence in IMSI catcher type of
attacks [17], rogue eNodeBs are operated with higher power
than surrounding eNodeBs. However, in LTE the functionality
of the UE may be different in some situations. In particular,
when a UE is very close to a serving eNodeB it does not scan
surrounding eNodeBs. This allows UEs to save power. Hence
to overcome this situation in our active attacks, we exploit an-
other feature named ‘absolute priority based cell reselection’,
and introduced in the LTE release 8 specification [24].
The principle of priority-based reselection is that UEs, in
the IDLE state, should periodically monitor and try to connect
to eNodeBs operated with high priority frequencies [24].
Hence even if the UE is close to a real eNodeB, operating the
rogue eNodeB on a frequency that has the highest reselection
priority would force UEs to attach to it. These priorities are
defined in SIB Type number 4, 5, 6, and 7 messages broadcast
by the real eNodeB [5]. Using passive attack setup, we sniff
these priorities and configure our eNodeB accordingly.
Further, the rogue eNodeB broadcasts MCC and MNC
numbers identical to the network operator of targeted sub-
scribers to impersonate the real network operator. Generally,
when UE detects a new TA it initiates a “TAU Request” to
the eNodeB. In order to trigger such request messages, the
rogue eNodeB operates on a TAC that is different from the
real eNodeB.
Implementation
The active attack is launched using the USRP B210 and
a host laptop which together are running OpenLTE. The
OpenLTE is an open source implementation of LTE spec-
ifications and includes an LTE_Fdd_enodeb application.
Although this application cannot be compared to a full-fledged
commercial eNodeB, it has the capability to execute a com-
plete LTE Attach procedure. In addition, some functionality
of the MME is implemented in LTE_Fdd_enodeb. Upon
successful completion of Attach, LTE_Fdd_enodeb can
also handle UE-originated services. However, currently it lacks
stability. We tested active attacks on UEs with USIMs from
three major national-level operators.
Further, we programmed LTE_Fdd_enodeb to include
LTE RRC and NAS protocol messages to demonstrate active
attacks. In addition, we modified the telephony protocol dis-
sector [25] available in Wireshark [26] to decode all messages
exchanged between the rogue eNodeB and UE. These modifi-
cations are submitted to the Wireshark project and are being
merged into the mainstream application.
C. Ethical considerations
Our work reveals vulnerabilities in LTE specifications
which are already in use in every LTE-enabled UE worldwide.
Further we also encountered several implementation issues in
popular smartphones and LTE network configuration issues.
Therefore we made an effort to responsibly disclose our work
to the relevant standard bodies and affected parties. Our reports
were acknowledged by all vendors and network operators we
contacted. For those vendors who have a standard responsible
disclosure process in place, we followed the process.
We carried out most of the active attacks in a Faraday
cage [27] to avoid affecting other UEs. For attacks in real
LTE networks, we took care not to interrupt normal service to
other UEs in the testing zone. Initially, we determined GUTIs
of our test UEs via passive attacks and fed them into our rogue
eNodeB. We programmed our rogue eNodeB to accept “TAU
/ Attach / Service Requests” only from these specified GUTIs
and to reject all requests from unknown UEs with the EMM
reject cause number 12 “Tracking area not allowed” [11].
Upon receipt of this message, all UEs other than our test UEs
disconnect automatically from our rogue eNodeB.
V. LOCATION LEAK ATTACKS OVER AIR INTERFACE
In this section, we show how the approximate location of
an LTE subscriber inside an urban area can be inferred by
applying a set of novel passive, semi-passive, and active at-
tacks. In particular, we track down the location of a subscriber
to a cell level (e.g., 2 km2 area) using passive attacks (L14)
and further determine the precise position using active attacks
(L3). We first describe the background for the attacks by
summarizing the features and aspects of LTE that are used by
the attacker. We then characterize preliminary measurements
used for realizing the attacks and new techniques for triggering
subscriber paging. Finally, we explain the attacks in detail.
A. Attack background
We now describe network configuration issues, subscriber
identity mapping technique, and observations about certain
LTE network access protocols. We will later make use of all
of these aspects in developing our attacks.
Network configuration issues
In LTE, network operators deploy various methods to
minimize signaling overhead introduced due to evolution of
networks, devices, and smartphone applications [28]. We iden-
tify two such deployment techniques relevant to our discussion.
Smart Paging: In GSM, paging messages are sent to an entire
location area. Thus it only allows the attacker to locate a
subscriber within a large (e.g., 100 km2) area [2]. However,
LTE paging is directed onto a small cell rather than to a large
TA. Such Smart Paging allows an attacker to locate an LTE
subscriber within a much smaller (e.g., 2 km2) area which is
a typical LTE cell size as observed in our experiments in a
major city.
GUTI persistence: Generally a fresh GUTI is allocated in
the following situations: (a) when MME is changed due to
handover or load balancing, b) during TAU or Attach proce-
dure, and c) when network issues NAS “GUTI reallocation
command”. However, network operators tend to not always
change GUTI during the above procedures [29]5. This allows
a passive attacker to track UEs based on their GUTIs.
4For the sake of simplicity, we refer location leaks attacks as L1, L2, and
L3 whereas DoS attacks as D1, D2, and D3 respectively.
5The reason for not changing GUTIs often is to avoid signaling storms in
LTE network as described in [29].
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Fig. 4. ‘Other’ folder in Facebook
Social identity to subscriber mapping
In previous work, phone calls (originating from a landline
phone) [2] and silent Short Message Service (SMS) [30] tech-
niques were used to page GSM subscribers thereby mapping
TMSIs to their phone numbers. However these methods are
not as effective anymore due to the availability of tools to
detect such attacks [31], [32]. We now discuss some features
in social network messaging applications that can be used to
trigger LTE paging requests to devices in which the subscriber
has installed the corresponding social network applications.
Facebook ‘Other’ message folder: Many Facebook [23] users
do not know about the ‘Other’ message folder (as shown in
Figure 4) in Facebook. Normally when a message is received
from a Facebook friend, it will be stored in the normal inbox
folder of that user. But messages from people who are not in
the friend list may be directed to the ‘Other’ folder. Further,
the user is not notified about messages in the ‘Other’ folder.
In fact, the user himself has to manually check ‘Other’ folder
to even notice that there are waiting messages. According
to Facebook [33], this is intended to protect users against
spam. When an LTE subscriber has the Facebook application
installed on his LTE device, all incoming Facebook messages,
including those that end up in the ‘Other’ folder, trigger a
paging request by the network. Other Facebook features, such
as repeated friend requests or poking (depending on the user’s
profile settings) also trigger paging requests. However, in those
cases, unlike in the case of messages that end up in the ‘Other’
folder, Facebook application notifies the user.
WhatsApp ‘typing notification’: WhatsApp supports a ‘typ-
ing notification’ feature - when someone (‘sender’) starts com-
posing a message to a person (‘recipient’) using WhatsApp,
the WhatsApp client UI at the recipient shows a notification to
the recipient that an incoming message is being typed. If the
recipient is using a WhatsApp client on an LTE device, this
ends up triggering a paging request.
RRC protocol issues
The LTE RRC protocol includes various functions needed
to set up and manage over-the-air connectivity between the
eNodeB and the UE as described in [5]. For our attacks,
we exploit two of these: network broadcast information and
measurement reports sent by UEs to the network.
Broadcast information: In this RRC protocol function, tem-
porary identities associated with UEs (i.e., GUTIs) are trans-
mitted over the air in a broadcast channel. Such broadcast
messages are neither authenticated nor encrypted. Hence any-
one can decode them with appropriate equipment. Since these
broadcast messages are only sent in specific geographical
areas, we can use the method described in [2] to reveal the
presence of subscribers in a targeted area by exploiting these
broadcast messages.
Further, the eNodeB periodically broadcasts SIB messages
which carry information for UEs to access the network, per-
form cell selection, and other information as described in [5].
The attacker can utilize this broadcast information to configure
the rogue eNodeB for malicious purposes.
UE measurement reports: In LTE, UE performs network
measurements and sends them to the eNodeB in RRC protocol
messages when requested. Such UE measurement reports
are necessary for network operators to troubleshoot signal
coverage issues. In particular, there are two types of UE
measurement reports - one sent in “Measurement Report”
used as part of handover procedure and other one in Radio
Link Failure (RLF) report - which are used to troubleshoot
signaling coverage. However, since these messages are not
protected during the RRC protocol communication, an attacker
can obtain these network measurements by simply decoding
from radio signals.
We now explain the importance of two RRC protocol
messages and measurement information they carry. First,
“Measurement Report” message is a necessary element during
handover procedure in LTE networks. Generally, eNodeB
sends a RRC message indicating what kind of information
is to be measured in response the UE sends “Measurement
Report” messages. We discovered that the LTE specification
allows sending this message to the UE without AS secu-
rity context [5]. Second, RLF report is a feature to detect
connection failures caused by intra-LTE mobility and inter-
system handovers between LTE, GSM, and 3G networks. Upon
detection of such events, RLF reports are created by the UE
and forwarded to eNodeB when requested. These reports are
collected by the Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
(OAM) system for troubleshooting. As per the LTE standard
specification [5] appendix A.6, the “UEInformationResponse”
message carrying RLF report should not be sent by the UE
before the activation of AS security context. However, we
discovered that major LTE baseband vendors failed to imple-
ment security protection for messages carrying RLF reports.
This suggests that the specification is ambiguous leading to
incorrect interpretation by multiple baseband vendors.
In particular, “Measurement Report” and “UEInformation-
Response” messages contain serving and neighboring LTE cell
identifiers with their corresponding power measurements and
also similar information of GSM and 3G cells. Additionally the
message can include the GPS location of the UE (and hence
of the subscriber) if this feature is supported. We exploit the
above vulnerabilities to obtain power measurements, which we
then use to calculate a subscriber’s precise location.
B. Initial measurements
We performed a measurement study on LTE networks of
three major operators to understand GUTI allocations, Smart
Paging, and mapping of tracking area and cell dimensions for
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the purpose of examining the feasibility aspects of location
leak attacks.
Before measuring GUTI allocations and Smart Paging,
we consider the following timing constraints for the paging
procedure in LTE. Paging messages are sent only if a UE
is in IDLE state. During an active connection, there are no
paging messages. According to [13], if the UE remains silent
for 10 seconds during a connection, the eNodeB releases the
associated radio resources and the UE moves into IDLE state.
GUTI variation: GUTI reallocation depends entirely on op-
erator configuration. We investigated GUTI allocation and
reallocation methods used by several operators. Specifically,
these experiments verify whether GUTIs are really temporary
in practice. We used a Samsung B3740 LTE USB data stick
as the UE, since it allows us to view the RRC and NAS
messages in Wireshark [34]. The changes in GUTI can be
seen in the “Attach Accept” or “TAU Accept” NAS messages
in the Wireshark traces. We identified these NAS messages
and recorded GUTIs for every operator for further analysis.
In addition, GUTI variation can be verified with engineering
mode on few selected handsets, for example LG G3 [35]. Our
results in Table I show that GUTI allocation and reallocation
mechanisms are similar among all operators. The results are
summarized below:
• Periodically (once an hour and once in 12 hours)
detaching and attaching the UE while it was stationary
resulted in the same GUTI being re-allocated in all
three operator networks. A stationary UE did not have
its GUTI changed for up to three days or when moving
between TAs within the city.
• When UE was moving inside the city for 3 days while
remaining attached to the network, no change in GUTI
was observed in any operator’s network.
• If a UE was completely turned off for one day, a new
GUTI was allocated when it was subsequently turned
on. In the case of one of the operators, the newly
assigned GUTI differed from the old one by only one
hexadecimal digit. This implies that GUTIs were not
chosen randomly.
Based on above observations we conclude that the GUTI
tends to remain the same even if a UE is moving within a
city for up to three days. Hence temporary identities are not
really temporary in any of the three networks. This allows an
attacker to perform passive attacks.
Activity Smart Paging GUTI changed?
on Cell on TA (All operators)
Facebook Message Yes No No
SMS Yes No No
VoLTE call No Yes No
Attach and Detach every 1 hour - - No
Attach and Detach every 12 hour - - No
Normal TAU procedure - - No
Periodic TAU procedure - - No
TABLE I: GUTI variations and Smart Paging behavior
Smart Paging: We identified multiple cells in a busy TA
for each operator and placed our passive LTE air-interface
sniffer within each cell. The test UE was placed in one of
the cells and remained stationary for the experiment duration.
Table I presents the set of activities performed to trigger paging
messages. The results are summarized as follows:
• Paging for Voice Over LTE (VoLTE6) call occurs on
the entire TA and paging for other IP applications
occurs on the last seen cell. This is referred to as ap-
plication aware paging [16]. Since VoLTE has higher
priority and strict timing constraints compared to other
data applications, the network pages the complete TA
to find the UE quickly.
• When the UE paging is triggered via Facebook or
SMS messages, sniffers detected a particular paging
message only in the cell where the UE is located (or
last seen). This implies that all operators are using
Smart Paging.
Mapping tracking area and cell dimensions: It is necessary
to have knowledge of the size of LTE tracking areas and cells
deployed in a metropolitan city for determining a victim’s
location. In particular, this knowledge enables an attacker
to identify targeted TAs for specific regions and network
operators in the city. We created a database that maps Tracking
Area Codes (TACs) to GPS coordinates by slowly bicycling
through the city. The TACs are periodically broadcast in SIB
Type number 1 messages [5]. We logged them using our
passive attack setup. Further, in order to determine the surface
area covered by a tracking area, we calculated the region
covered by the points with the same TAC and the results are
plotted in Figure 5. The size of TA inside the city varies from
10 to 30 km2. According to OpenCellID [36] tracking areas
outside the city center cover 80 - 100 km2. The TAs are
smaller in size compared to the GSM location areas plotted
by [37] in the same city.
Fig. 5. LTE tracking area and cells of a major operator in a city
Since the granularity we obtain through our attacks is
on a cell level, it is important to know cell sizes in LTE
network as compared to GSM. Further, this knowledge helps
in positioning the rogue eNodeB to maximize the effect of
active attacks. In order to plot cell boundaries, we used the
6VoLTE stands for voice over LTE and it is for voice calls over an LTE
network, rather than the 2G or 3G connections which are usually used.
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cellmapper [38] Android application which reports the cell
ID, eNodeB ID, and Radio Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of
the cell in real time. Initially, we identified a point with high
signal strength (possibly close to the eNodeB) and marked
it for the reference. Then we walked in all directions from
the reference point till reaching the cell edge. Cell edges are
identified when RSSI becomes very poor and the UE triggers
a cell change. In this way, we traced the boundaries of the 5
cells and marked them inside the TA as shown in Figure 5.
Based on the cell sizes measured, we find out that a major
operator implemented micro cells in their LTE infrastructure.
Typical size of a micro cell ranges from 200 - 2000 m in
radius [39].
C. Passive attack - link subscriber locations/movements over
time (L1)
In passive attack mode, attacker’s objective is to collect a
set of IMSIs and GUTIs which can be used for two purposes.
One is to verify subscriber’s presence in certain area, and other
is to reveal his past and future movements in that area. To
achieve this, we sniff over the LTE air interface and decode
broadcast paging channels to extract IMSIs and GUTIs. These
identities can be collected in locations such as airports or
subscriber’s home or office. The attacker needs to map IMSI or
GUTI associated with a particular subscriber to reveal his/her
presence in that area. Since GUTI is persistent for several days
in our experiments (see Section V-B), its disclosure makes the
subscriber’s movements linkable. The mapping between GUTI
and IMSI is possible using semi-passive attacks.
D. Semi-Passive attack - leak coarse location (L2)
The objective of the semi-passive attack is to determine the
presence of a subscriber in a TA and further, to find the cell in
which the subscriber is physically located in. In particular, we
demonstrate the use of novel tracking techniques to initially
determine the TA and then exploit Smart Paging to identify a
cell within that TA.
Determining tracking area and cell ID
We use following two methods to generate signaling mes-
sages for performing the attack.
Using VoLTE calls: We placed 10 VoLTE calls to the victim.
The VoLTE call connection times are very short at around 3
seconds according to previous work [40]. Hence, the attacker
has to choose the call duration so that it is long enough for a
paging request to broadcast by the eNodeB but short enough
to not trigger any notification on the UE’s application user
interface. As explained earlier, VoLTE has high priority and
therefore its paging requests are broadcast to all eNodeBs in a
TA. Hence it is sufficient to monitor any single cell within the
TA for paging messages. The observed GUTIs undergo a set
intersection analysis where we apply the method proposed by
Kune et.al [2] to reveal the mapping between the GUTI and
phone number of the subscriber. Once successful, the presence
of the subscriber is confirmed in that TA.
Using social network and applications: Social identities are a
compelling attack vector because mobile subscribers nowadays
use mobile phones for accessing popular social networks and
instant messaging applications. The primary intention of the
attacker is to trigger paging requests via social identities
without LTE subscribers being aware of it. For triggering
paging messages, various mobile applications can be used.
Due to popularity and size of user base we chose Facebook and
WhatsApp applications for our experiments. However tracking
subscribers using social applications is not as effective as using
VoLTE calls.
We used Facebook messages as described in Section V-A
to trigger Smart Paging to localize the target subscriber to a
specific cell. Similar to VoLTE calls, we send 10-20 messages
to the subscriber via Facebook and do the set intersection
analysis to link GUTIs to Facebook profiles. If the mapping
is successful in a particular cell where the attacker is, the
presence of the subscriber is confirmed. Otherwise the attacker
needs to move to other cells and repeat the same procedure.
The attacker can also place passive sniffers in every cell to
speed up the localization procedure. However, this is expen-
sive. The subscriber’s presence is successfully determined in
a cell a cell that is typically of size 2 km2, i.e. much smaller
than a GSM cell.
We also used WhatsApp similarly to exploit its “typing
notification” feature. In this case, the attacker requires the
phone number to identify the subscriber on WhatsApp. In
addition, the victim’s privacy settings must allow the attacker
to view the victim’s WhatsApp profile. First, the attacker sends
a message to the target recipient. Once it is received, the
recipient’s WhatsApp application will list it in the inbox. For
the attack to succeed, it is essential that the recipient does
not block or delete the attacker’s contact. Later, the attacker
opens his active chat window corresponding to the recipient
and composes a message but does not send. Due to the “typing
notification” feature, the recipient can see that the attacker is
typing in the chat window. During this procedure, network
triggers paging request destined for recipient’s LTE devices.
E. Active attack - leak fine-grained location (L3)
Once the attacker determines a TA and cell where the
subscriber is present, the next goal is to find his/her location
more precisely. We now demonstrate two methods in which
the attacker exploits a specification and an implementation
vulnerability to this end.
1. Via measurement reports: We consider a subscriber who
is initially attached to a legitimate eNodeB. The attacker
forces him/her to attach to a rogue eNodeB by applying the
techniques mentioned in Section IV-B. The subscriber’s UE
completes RRC connection procedures and initiates a TAU
procedure with attacker’s rogue eNodeB. Next, UE enters into
CONNECTED state. The attacker creates a “RRC Connection
Reconfiguration” message with different cell IDs (possibly 3 or
more neighbor cells) and necessary frequencies, and sends it to
the UE without any protection. After receiving this unprotected
message, UE computes the signal power from neighboring
cells and frequencies and sends an unprotected “Measurement
Report” message to the rogue eNodeB.
If the UE supports ‘locationInfo-r10’ feature [5], it includes
its GPS coordinates in the measurement report. This feature
is not yet widely supported by current smartphones - however
one of our test phone exhibited this behavior.
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2. Via RLF reports: In this attack, two rogue eNodeBs are
operated in the same cell where the subscriber is present.
Initially eNodeB 2 is OFF and eNodeB 1 ON to create a RLF
scenario to the UE. The UE initiates connection to eNodeB 1
and enters into CONNECTED state as shown in Figure 6. We
turn OFF eNodeB 1 upon receiving a TAU request from the
UE. At the same time, eNodeB 2 is turned ON. Meanwhile
UE detects that it has lost sync with the eNodeB 1 and starts
RLF timer (T310).
When the RLF timer expires, UE creates a RLF report [5]
and goes into IDLE mode. In this mode, UE starts cell selection
procedure as specified in [12] to attach to eNodeB 2. As
before, UE enters the CONNECTED state with eNodeB 2 and
indicates the availability of RLF report in a TAU message.
Upon receiving this message, the attacker sends an unprotected
“UEInformationRequest” message to UE from eNodeB 2,
thereby requesting UE to send RLF report to eNodeB 2 in
response. As a result, UE sends the resulting response in an un-
protected “UEInformationResponse” message containing the
RLF report. This report contains failure events and specifically
signal strengths of neighboring eNodeBs.
In addition, according to the LTE specification [41], RLF
report can include GPS coordinates [5] of UE at the time it
experienced the radio failure. As before, this feature is not
widely implemented yet.
Fig. 6. Retrieving RLF report from UE (L3)
Determining subscriber’s precise location
Aforementioned measurement and RLF reports provide
signal strengths allowing the active attacker to calculate dis-
tance between the UE and the rogue eNodeB. This calcula-
tion is performed using a trilateration technique as described
in [42]. Figure 7 shows how this technique is used to determine
subscriber’s location. The distance estimates are calculated as
d1, d2, and d3 for three neighboring base stations. The zone of
intersection point of three circles is subscriber’s approximate
location in a cell. However, if ‘locationInfo-r10’ feature is
supported in measurement and RLF reports, accurate location
can be determined using GPS coordinates.
Fig. 7. Determining subscriber’s precise location using trilateration (L3)
VI. DOS ATTACKS ON LTE AIR INTERFACE
In this section, we demonstrate how an attacker can ex-
ploit two LTE specification vulnerabilities to deny LTE, and
also GSM and 3G network services to subscribers. First, we
describe the attack background and present three types of
persistent DoS attacks labeled D1, D2, and D3. Later, we
discuss their impact on LTE subscribers and operator services.
A. Attack background
We exploit the EPS Mobility Management (EMM) protocol
messages which are required for control of UE mobility in
LTE networks. In particular, we exploit two functions of EMM
messages described below.
1. TAU procedure: One of the main function of EMM
protocol messages is to inform the network about UE’s present
location in the serving area of the operator. This allows the
MME to offer network services to the UE, e.g., when there
is a incoming call. For this purpose, UE notifies the MME
of its current TA by sending a “TAU Request” message and
also includes its network modes. Generally, UE operates in
various network modes for voice and data connections as stated
in [11], but for this work we focus only on two modes: i) EPS
services (i.e., LTE services), ii) both EPS and non-EPS (i.e.,
GSM or 3G) services. During a TAU procedure, the UE and
MME agree on one of these modes depending on the type
of subscription (for example, USIM is subscribed for LTE
services), and network capabilities supported by the UE and
by the operator in a particular area.
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During TAU procedure the network may deny some ser-
vices to UEs, for example if the subscriber’s USIM is not
authorized for LTE services or if the operator does not support
certain services in the serving area. The LTE specification [11]
defines certain EMM procedures to convey such denial mes-
sages to UEs. Specifically, these are sent in “TAU Reject”
messages which are not integrity protected.
2. LTE Attach procedure: During an Attach procedure,
UE sends a list of its capabilities to the network in an
“Attach Request” message. In particular, these capabilities
include supported networks (such as LTE, GSM or 3G),
security algorithms, and other features as defined in [11].
However, these capabilities are sent unprotected and hence,
the list can be altered by an attacker. To protect against MiTM
attacks, the LTE security architecture mandates reconfirmation
of previously negotiated security capabilities after the AKA
procedure [10]. In particular, the network sends an integrity-
protected message including the list of supported security
algorithms previously received from the UE. However, there
is no similar confirmation for UE’s network capabilities.
B. Downgrade to non-LTE network services (D1)
We identify a vulnerability in the LTE specification which
enables the following DoS attacks D1. We exploit the fact
that certain “TAU Reject” messages sent from the network are
accepted by UEs without any integrity protection. In particular,
there is no need of mutual authentication and security contexts
between the UE and network for accepting such reject mes-
sages. Note that, the attacker does not need any security keys
to send “TAU Reject” messages. Hence, the attacks can be
targeted towards any LTE subscribers within the range of the
rogue eNodeB. Similar types of attacks are also possible with
“Service Reject/ Attach Reject” messages.
As shown in Figure 8, the UE sends “TAU Request”
message to attacker’s rogue eNodeB. Note that as the UE is
attached to the real network, this message can be integrity
protected using the existing NAS security context. However,
according to LTE specification [11](section 4.4.5), this mes-
sage is not encrypted. As a result, rogue eNodeB decodes it and
responds with a “TAU Reject” message. The attacker includes
EMM cause number 7 “LTE services not allowed” into this
message. As no integrity protection is required, the victim’s UE
accepts the message. The UE proceeds to act on the indicated
rejection cause by deleting all existing EPS contexts associated
with the earlier (real) network.
As a result, UE updates its status to “EU3 ROAMING
NOT ALLOWED”7 and considers the USIM and hence the
UE as invalid for LTE services until it is rebooted or USIM
is re-inserted. Further, UE does not search for or attach to
legitimate LTE networks even if they are available in that area,
causing a denial of service. However, if supported, the UE
searches for GSM or 3G network in the same area to gain
network services. By downgrading subscribers, an attacker
could attempt to launch known 2G or 3G attacks, besides loss
of LTE services.
7It means that last TAU procedure was correctly performed, but reply from
the MME was negative due to roaming or subscription restrictions.
Fig. 8. DoS attack - denying LTE network services (D1)
Fig. 9. DoS attack - denying all mobile network services (D2)
C. Denying all network services (D2)
D2 is similar to D1 but the result is different. The UE
initiates TAU request procedure and rogue eNodeB responds
with a TAU Reject message with the cause number 8 which
is “LTE and non-LTE services not allowed”. After receiving
this message, the UE sets LTE status to “EU3 ROAMING NOT
ALLOWED” and considers USIM invalid for the network until
it is rebooted or USIM is re-inserted. Further, it enters the
state EMM-DEREGISTERED: UE’s location is unknown to
the MME and is not reachable for any mobile services. As
a result, UE does not attempt to attach to LTE, GSM, or 3G
networks for normal services even if networks are available.
The UE remains in the EMM-DEREGISTERED state even it
moves to a new TA or even to a new city, thereby causing
a persistent denial of service. Signaling messages exchanged
between the UE and the rogue eNodeB are shown in Figure 9.
D. Denying selected services (D3)
In this attack, the active attacker modifies messages ex-
changed between the eNodeB and UE. However, note that
this attack was not performed during our experiments due to
unavailability of UE baseband software.
The UE initiates an “Attach Request” message to the
eNodeB and this message is intercepted by the attacker. The
message contains “Voice domain preference and UE’s usage
setting” which informs the network about UE’s voice calling
capabilities. The attacker removes these capabilities from this
unprotected message and adds “Additional update type -
SMS only” before forwarding it to the network. The network
accepts this message and executes AKA protocol with the
UE to complete Attach procedure. However at this step, the
MME configures UE’s profile with the received (modified)
capabilities, thereby allowing only SMS and data services.
When there is an incoming call for UE, the MME rejects it and
informs the cause to the subscriber who is calling. On the other
hand, if UE tries to make an outgoing voice call, the network
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rejects this request and informs the cause. This is an example
of a bidding down attack. The denial is persistent since the
attack is effective even after the attacker has moved away.
However, the user can recover from the attack by restarting
the UE or moving to another TA. 3GPP specifications does
indeed mention a timer (T3245) that a UE can use to recover
from EMM DISCONNECTED state [43]. However, the use of
this timer is optional (none of the devices we tested implement
this timer). The default timer value (24-48 hours) is too large
in the case of DoS attacks.
E. Impact on end-users and operators
Unlike the LTE jamming DoS attacks described in [44], our
attacks are against UEs in a certain area instead of against LTE
networks. A successful attack would deny the target UE from
utilizing network services. Typically, the UE remains in non-
service state for some time period even if the attacker shuts
down his rogue eNodeB or moves away from attacking area.
Consequently, this attack is more serious than other types of
DoS attacks (for example jamming and RACH flood [45] that
are difficult to prevent). Impact of these attacks are as follows:
• Subscriber’s UE may not alert the user about the un-
availability of legitimate services. However, depend-
ing on the alert notification capabilities provided by
application layer of various mobile operating systems
installed on the UE, the subscriber could be notified
of limited services or no network connectivity status.
We noticed that there is no standard approach across
different mobile operating systems to indicate the type
of active network mode (e.g., 2G/GSM, 3G, LTE) to
the user.
• Subscribers will not be able to receive or make nor-
mal calls and data connections. Hence, a significant
loss is incurred to both network operators and their
subscribers. Network operators are not able to offer
services since subscribers are unavailable technically
and no billing would occur.
• UE can still make emergency calls. However, emer-
gency calls are not possible when UE is attached to a
rogue eNodeB.
• LTE-capable M2M devices which are not attended by
technicians on a daily basis could be blocked out from
network services for a long time. This is due to the
fact that M2M devices need to be rebooted or USIM
needs to re-inserted to recover from the attacks.
VII. ATTACK FEASIBILITY AND AMPLIFICATION
In this section, we discuss the feasibility of both location
leak and DoS attacks against popular LTE smartphones and
methods to amplify the coverage range of our attacks.
Several of the vulnerabilities we exploited are in the LTE
specifications rather than in the UE’s baseband software.
Therefore, all LTE-capable UEs conforming to these spec-
ifications are affected. For evaluation, we selected popular
smartphones incorporating baseband implementations from top
vendors who dominate the market share worldwide [46]. We
successfully verified that all these phones are vulnerable to
our attacks. In addition, all UEs have the implementation
vulnerability leading to attack L3.
We further investigated on how UEs recover from DoS
attacks. We found out that all UEs recover after rebooting
or re-inserting the USIM. Additionally, UEs having baseband
from most vendors can recover by toggling the flight mode.
Attack amplification: Related to our passive attacks, we
determined the average cell radius of a major operator in a
city is 800 meters for the 2.6 GHz and 1 km for the 800
MHz frequency band. The USRP B210 used for our attacks
has a maximum output power of 20dbm (100mW) [47] with
a coverage range of 50 to 100 meters. However, the signal
coverage area can be increased with a suitable power ampli-
fier. Specifically, based on the COST 231 radio propagation
model [48], we calculated that by mounting a USRP at a height
of 10m (e.g., on a street lamp) and amplifying the power by 10
dB, it is possible to deny LTE and non-LTE services for every
subscriber in a cell. For a reference, OpenBTS projects [49],
[50] use USRPs to provide GSM coverage in rural areas with
>2 km coverage with an external power amplifier and antenna.
Similarly, signal coverage area of our rogue eNodeB could be
increased to demonstrate feasibility of the attack.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss vulnerabilities discovered in the
specifications and their impact on LTE security. We explain the
background behind the vulnerabilities by considering various
trade-offs between security and criteria like availability and
performance. We show that the equilibrium points in the trade-
offs have shifted today compared to where they were when the
LTE security architecture was being designed. We also discuss
countermeasures for the vulnerabilities that made our attacks
possible. Table II summarizes our analysis.
A. Possible trade-offs
Security vs Availability: We demonstrated a vulnerability in
the LTE RRC protocol specification that allows the adversary
to obtain unprotected measurement reports from UEs (L3).
We consider the following two angles to explain the trade-
off. On one hand, in some cases network operators require
unprotected reports for troubleshooting purposes. In particular,
if the UE is not able to establish connection with the eNodeB
then it may be necessary to send measurement reports without
protection in order allow the network to identify technical
reason behind the fault. This seems to be the reasons behind
the note in LTE RRC specification which points out that
the 3GPP Radio Access Network (RAN2) working group
decided to permit UEs to send reports even without security
activation [5]. On the other hand, during the design work
for the LTE security architecture, the 3GPP security working
group (SA3) suggested that all RRC protocol messages should
be sent in encrypted form [51]. Hence, the vulnerability in
RRC protocol specification is a conscious exception to this
security design guidance [5]. Clearly, 3GPP has concluded
that in this particular case the requirement of having network
availability all the time to all UEs outweighs security concerns
related to subscribers’ privacy.
Security vs Performance: We observed that UEs are required
to reboot or re-insert USIM after DoS attacks in order to
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regain network services. This behavior, exhibited by all LTE
devices we tested, is according to the LTE specification. Since
the network denies services for valid reject causes described
in [11], the UE restricts itself from re-initiating LTE (or any
mobile network) Attach procedure in order to conserve battery
power. In addition, frequent unsuccessful Attach requests from
UEs would increase signaling load on the network. These
are the reasons why the LTE specification requires the UE
to reboot or re-insert USIM to recover from reject messages.
This preference of performance over security leaves LTE
subscribers vulnerable to the DoS attacks (D1 & D2).
As another example, during Attach, UE’s security capabili-
ties are sent back to it for confirmation after security activation
in order to protect against bidding down attacks. This is an
application of the well-known ‘matching history’ principle
used in security protocol design [52]. However, UE’s network
capabilities are not protected in similar manner, enabling a
different type of bidding down attack (D3). The reason for
not applying the matching history principle to all negotiated
parameters, as discussed in VI-A, indicates another trade-off
where added security has not outweighed performance loss
due to the full application of the matching history principle.
To apply the matching history principle to all parameters would
have required the inclusion of a cryptographic hash of all the
parameters, instead of the parameters themselves. However,
confirming only the security information capabilities, which
take up much less space (only a few bits) compared to a full
cryptographic hash, minimizes the overhead in signaling.
A third example we observed is that in some operator
networks, GUTIs are not changed even after three days of
usage (L1). LTE specifications do not mandate any GUTI
reallocation frequency, leaving it to as a policy decision to
operators. One possible reason for the low GUTI-change
frequency is the operators’ wish to reduce signaling overhead
by trading off privacy.
Security vs Functionality: Our attacks that leak coarse-
grained location information by using social network mes-
saging services (L2) is an example of the tension between
security and functionality. The introduction of TCP/IP based
data communication on top of mobile communication infras-
tructures has greatly expanded the functionality that third party
developers can build for these networks. But such a flexible
software architecture makes it harder to avoid or detect the
type of vulnerability that led to this attack. Furthermore, even
if individual app developers would fix their applications (e.g.,
Facebook could change the application architecture of their
Messenger application to ensure that messages that end up
in the ”Other” box do not trigger paging requests), other
application developers may make similar mistakes. To avoid
such vulnerabilities in a modern mobile communication system
like LTE, it would require significant developer outreach and
education to help them design and build mobile optimized
applications [53].
Summary: The design philosophy of LTE security required
leaving some safety margin in security mechanisms in order
to protect against changes in trade-offs. However, in the above
cases the safety margins turn out to be too narrow. As a
general learning on an abstract concept level, it would be
better to include agility in the security mechanisms instead of
a rigid safety margin. The forthcoming fifth generation (5G)
technology will offer better possibilities to engineer agility and
flexibility for security because software defined networking
and cloud computing are among the key concepts of emerging
5G architectures.
3GPP follows the good practice of documenting exceptions
when specification needs to deviate from the general security
design principles recommended by the security working group
(as was the case with L3 or D1/D2/D3). We recommend further
that each such exception should also trigger an analysis of its
implications. For example, if an exception is made to forego in-
tegrity protection for a denial message from the network, then
the standards group should consider what happens and how to
recover if the denial message contains incorrect information.
B. Countermeasures and discussion
We now discuss potential countermeasures against attacks
demonstrated in earlier sections. In particular, we identify
protocol-level and operational fixes that can be implemented
by baseband vendors and mobile network operators. Some of
these countermeasures are much more straight-forward than
others. Similarly, some of our proposals may cause hidden de-
pendencies and more changes may be needed in the networks
than what is apparent from our descriptions.
Protection against location leaks: LTE broadcast information
include subscriber identities which enable tracking of UEs
(L1 and L2). The broadcast information must be sent in
unprotected messages from LTE system design perspective.
There are two solutions to avoid UEs being tracked. One
solution is to protect broadcast messages using a public key
mechanism but this requires relatively big changes in LTE
protocols. According to [54], 3GPP decided against usage of
public key mechanisms because its implementation cost was
deemed too high. However, our findings may have changed the
equilibrium in this trade-off. Consequently, a scheme where
public/private keys are used only for network elements could
possibly be justified now. Messages from the network could be
signed by using a public key digital signature mechanism; UEs
would then be able to verify the authenticity of such messages.
This would prevent rogue network elements from sending false
information, e.g., false messages indicating radio link failures
(L3). Messages towards the network could be encrypted using
the public key of the serving operator; UEs would not need
to send their identities in the clear to initiate network Attach
procedure. It is not easy to protect paging messages with public
key mechanisms, even if we would have public keys for UEs
because UEs would have to try to decrypt all paging messages.
All these proposed fixes require ensuring global availability
and verifiability of public keys of network components (such
as eNodeB).
The second solution is more realistic as it does not require
change in protocols. Network operators would simply re-
allocate GUTIs often enough to avoid tracking. One of the
national operators to whom we reported our findings, acknowl-
edged the feasibility of our attacks and already configured
their networks to prevent tracking based on GUTIs. This
solution would protect against passive attacks (L1). A certain
degree of protection against semi-passive adversaries could be
achieved by making the adversary’s actions more visible to the
subscriber. There are already such tools [31], [32] available
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Attack Adversary Vulnerability Potential fix
Group Description Type Type Possible trade-off
Location
Leak
Link location over time (L1) Passive Underspecification (Perceived) security vs availability Policy to guarantee GUTI freshness
Leak coarse-grained location (L2) Semi-passive Application software architecture Security vs functionality Tools like Darshak [31] & SnoopSnitch [32] to visualize suspicious signaling to subscribers
Leak fine-grained location (L3) Active Specification & implementation flaw (Perceived) security vs availability Network authentication for requests; ciphering for responses
Denial of
Service
Downgrade to non-LTE services (D1) Active Specification flaw Security vs performance Timer-based recovery
Deny all services (D2) Active Specification flaw Security vs performance Timer-based recovery
Deny selected services(D3) Active Specification flaw Security vs performance Extend “matching conversation” check to more (all) negotiation parameters
TABLE II: LTE attacks, vulnerability analysis, and fixes
but the challenge is in making them usable and useful to all
types of subscribers. LTE specification vulnerability regarding
UEs sending measurement reports without integrity protection
needs to be addressed by the 3GPP security group in order for
all baseband vendors to eventually implement the fix in their
products. The simplest solution is to transmit measurement
reports only after setting up the security context.
Protection against DoS: The specification vulnerabilities re-
sponsible for DoS attacks based on TAU procedure (D1 and
D2) can be fixed without changes in the protocol itself. The
3GPP SA3 group may propose a new mechanism based on a
counter or timer value to recover from DoS attacks. If the UE is
detached from the network for a certain duration as a result of a
TAU reject messages, it should reset the configuration settings
in the USIM or baseband to re-attach itself with the network
without bothering the user, i.e., without having to reboot or
require re-insertion of USIM. If there is an infrastructure
to support distribution of operator public keys, TAU reject
messages could be signed by the network and verified by UEs.
Next, we discuss protection against DoS stemming from
bidding down attacks (D3). During an Attach procedure, the
UE’s network and security capabilities are sent to the network.
The attacker can modify this list to downgrade capabilities
reported by the UE and and forward it to the network. To
protect against such modification, both 3G and LTE contain the
partial ‘matching history’ mechanism discussed above. This
allows UE to check that its original list of security capabilities
are identical with the ones received by the network. We argue
that similar protection for network capabilities is required due
to the fact that the DoS attack has a persistent nature. This
would of course require change in the LTE protocols. Again,
with the use of operator public keys, it would be possible to use
digital signatures to protect lists of capabilities broadcast by the
network. Alternatively, the negotiation of network capabilities
could be done after AKA is successfully completed.
IX. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe related work in GSM, 3G, and
LTE air-interface security area. Previous works have reported
attacks against 2G and 3G access network protocols [2],
[55], core network protocols [56], [57], [58], [59], as well as
services [60]. In passive attacks, Kune et al. [2] showed that
despite the use of temporary IDs, the location of a subscriber’s
UE in a GSM network can be leaked. In specific, it was shown
that an attacker can check if a UE is within a small area,
or absent from a large area, without subscriber’s awareness.
However, their location leaks granularity is lower and it is
improved with our attacks on LTE networks. The 3GPP discuss
a set of threats exposed in E-UTRAN [51] during LTE security
study. However, the attacks we presented are not identified
by the study. In active attacks, the authors in [61] present a
method to determine the presence of a subscriber in a particular
area by exploiting a vulnerability in 3G AKA protocol. By
leveraging a rogue eNodeB (femtocell), previously captured
authentication parameters are replayed to the UE and the
presence is confirmed based on the response from the phone.
However their attack cannot reveal approximate location of the
UE in a given area.
In DoS attacks, the authors in [44] describe that unauthen-
ticated attach requests sent from a compromised UE/eNodeB
to flood the MME and in turn to the HSS, leading to a DoS
attack. However their DoS attacks are against the network
and not against LTE subscribers. Through simulations the
authors in [62] show that Botnets can cause DoS attacks by
exhausting subscriber traffic capacity over the air interface.
A proof of concept paper by P. Jover et al. [63] provides
an overview of new effective attacks (smart jamming) that
extend the range and effectiveness of basic radio jamming.
However according to [54], both aforementioned flooding and
jamming attacks are non-persistent DOS attacks hence not
considered as a threat to address in the LTE architecture. In
contrast, our DoS attacks are persistent and targeted towards
the UE (subscribers). LTE security architecture and a detailed
list of security vulnerabilities existing in the LTE networks
have been presented in [64]. Our attacks are not presented
in this survey. Two recent papers [65], [66] discuss resource
stealing and DoS attacks against VoLTE, whereas our focus
is against LTE access network protocols. To the best of our
knowledge, there was no previous work evaluating practical
attacks on LTE access networks in the literature.
X. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the vulnerabilities we discovered
in LTE access network protocols lead to new privacy and
availability threats to LTE subscribers. We demonstrated that
our attacks can be mounted using open source LTE software
stack and readily available hardware at low cost. The need for
engineering the correct trade-offs between security and other
requirements (availability, performance, and functionality) led
to the vulnerabilities in the first place. Such trade-offs are
essential for the success of any large-scale system. But the
trade-off equilibrium points are not static. We recommend that
future standardization efforts take this into account.
Impact: We followed standard responsible disclosure prac-
tices of all affected manufacturers. We also notified affected
operators as well as the standards body (3GPP). All four
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manufacturers acknowledged our report. Two of them have
already released patches [67], [68]. Two of three operators
have fixed the configuration issues in their networks. 3GPP has
initiated several updates to the LTE specifications to address
the issues we raised [69]. Up-to-date information about impact
may be found in the arXiv report version of this paper [6] and
on our project website8.
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Acronyms
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
AS Access Stratum
DoS Denial-of-Service
E-UTRAN Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
EMM EPS mobility Management
eNodeB evolved NodeB
EPC Evolved Packet Core
EPS Evolved Packet System
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System for Mobile Communication
GSMA GSM Association
GUTI Globally Unique Temporary Identifier
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identifier
LTE Long Term Evolution
M2M Machine to Machine
MME Mobility Management Entity
NAS Non-Access Stratum
RLF Radio Link Failure
RRC Radio Resource Control
RSSI Radio Signal Strength Indicator
SIB System Information Block
TA Tracking Area
TAC Tracking Area Code
TAU Tracking Area Update
UE User Equipment
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
USRP Universal Software Radio Peripheral
VoLTE Voice over LTE
TABLE III: Summary of Acronyms
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